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Last year farmers received $746 million in net crop in-surance payments. But the 
program cost taxpayers approxi-
mately $2.5 billion, or $3.31 for 
each dollar paid out. Since 2001, 
when the provisions of the Agricul-
tural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) 
fully came into force, taxpayers 
have paid $15.1 billion to deliver 
$8.82 billion to farmers. This im-
balance between taxpayer costs 
and producer benefi ts has led 
some to question whether money 
allocated to crop insurance might 
be more effi ciently used elsewhere 
in USDA’s budget. For example, 
producers would have received all 
$15.1 billion if the funds had been 
sent out in the form of direct pay-
ments. Or, this $15.1 billion could 
support the Conservation Reserve 
Program for nine years. Or, of 
course, our national debt would be 
$15.1 billion smaller now without 
the program.
One diffi culty in evaluating 
whether crop insurance funds are 
being used effi ciently is the com-
plex nature of the program. Simply 
put, relatively few people outside 
the industry really understand 
how the program works and what 
is being supported by taxpayer 
funds. In order to make a judg-
ment about the program’s relative 
merits, fi rst we need to understand 
why it costs $15.1 billion to deliver 
$8.82 billion to farmers.
A Public-Private Partnership
The U.S. crop insurance pro-
gram is funded by taxpayers, 
regulated by USDA’s Risk Manage-
ment Agency (RMA), but sold and 
serviced by private business. There 
are economic and historical reasons 
why the program is neither all public 
nor all private. 
The private sector is good at 
developing insurance markets when 
the insured risks have the attribute 
that the premiums from the many 
will cover the losses of the few every 
year. Examples include fi re losses, 
loss of life, and crop damage from 
hail. In any year, total insurance 
losses are fairly predictable, so pre-
miums can be set to allow insurance 
companies to make a predictable 
rate of return. 
The private sector is reluctant 
to offer insurance when insurance 
claims vary dramatically from year 
to year. Examples include fl oods, 
hurricanes, and crop losses due to 
droughts. When these events occur, 
annual premiums cannot cover loss-
es, and bankruptcy for the insuring 
company is a real possibility. Most 
researchers have concluded that a 
purely private crop insurance market 
would not exist because the risks are 
too large. Thus, if we want to have 
a crop insurance program, then we 
must have some degree of public sec-
tor involvement in providing back-
stop protection in large-loss years.
From Congress’s perspective, the 
purpose of the crop insurance pro-
gram is to reduce the need for annual 
declarations of agricultural disasters, 
with subsequent emergency spend-
ing bills. This objective will only be 
met if crop insurance is widely avail-
able and widely purchased. Begin-
ning in 1980, Congress has passed 
a series of crop insurance reform 
packages designed to expand the 
program, primarily by giving large 
incentives to the private sector to 
make insurance widely available and 
to farmers to buy the product. With 
ARPA, crop insurance is available 
to nearly all crops, and the propor-
tion of crop acreage that is insured is 
approximately 80 percent. But now 
that Congress has accomplished its 
objective, are the benefi ts from the 
program worth the costs? The last 
three columns of Table 1 (p. 3) show 
the three categories of taxpayer 
costs during the ARPA period. The 
fi rst three columns show how the 
program has grown under ARPA.
Producer Premium Subsidies
Farmers must pay for crop insur-
ance, but they pay only a portion of 
the amount needed to cover insured 
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losses. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, farmers were reluctant to buy 
enough crop insurance to satisfy 
Congress. So to get farmers to buy 
more insurance, ARPA dramatically 
decreased the portion that farmers 
must pay. Currently, farmers pay 
about 41 percent of the amount need-
ed to cover insured losses. This large 
subsidy means that most farmers will 
get substantially more back from the 
program than they pay into it. 
It is somewhat of a paradox why 
farmers require such large subsidies 
to buy a product that substantially 
reduces their fi nancial risk. But farm-
ers routinely reduce fi nancial risk 
in a number of other ways. Growing 
more than a single crop, raising live-
stock, working off-farm, employing 
marketing tools, and adopting risk-
reducing management practices—all 
work to reduce fi nancial vulnerabil-
ity. In addition, for the lowest-risk 
farmers, the price of crop insurance 
may not adequately refl ect their risk. 
So one explanation for this paradox 
is that for many farmers, the amount 
of remaining fi nancial risk they face 
may simply be too small to insure 
unless the price of insurance is low 
enough. The current 59 percent aver-
age subsidy seems to have reduced 
the price of insurance to the point 
where most farmers now consider it 
worthwhile to purchase. This premi-
um subsidy is now so large that the 
average farmer in the program can 
expect a rate of return on the pro-
ducer paid premium of 143 percent.
Administrative and 
Operating Subsidies
It costs money to deliver crop insur-
ance. Company salaries must be 
paid. Agent commissions must be 
paid. Loss claims must be verifi ed 
and paid. And regulatory require-
ments must be met. In 1980, Con-
gress decided that delivery of the 
crop insurance program should be 
given to the private sector so that 
the program could be expanded as 
rapidly as possible. Companies had 
an incentive to expand sales be-
cause they were essentially paid a 
sales commission. For each dollar of 
premium they brought in, companies 
were given a percentage. Currently 
companies are paid A&O (administra-
tive and operating) subsidies equal 
to about 21.5 percent of the premium. 
With $4 billion in premiums, this 
amounts to approximately $840 mil-
lion in subsidies.
The A&O percent subsidy has 
fallen steadily over the last 10 years 
from 31 percent in 1997. But this does 
not mean that companies are getting 
by on less total reimbursement. In 
1997, total premiums were $1.7 bil-
lion. By 2005, total premiums were 
$3.95 billion. So A&O subsidies have 
increased by 60 percent since 1997 
even though insured acreage has in-
creased by only 35 percent. 
The largest expense covered by 
A&O is agent commissions. Com-
missions vary dramatically across 
agents depending on how attractive 
an agent’s customers are to a com-
pany. Some agents are paid up to 20 
percent (or more) for each dollar of 
premium they bring to a company. It 
seems odd that farmers still need to 
be convinced by commission-based 
agents that they need to buy crop in-
surance. The program is now so well 
known and the premium subsidies 
are so large that perhaps Congress 
can fi nally declare success at meet-
ing its 1980 expansion objective and 
begin to change the program.
Net Underwriting Gains
Crop insurance companies do not 
live on A&O subsidies alone. In years 
in which premiums exceed insurance 
claims, companies get to keep a por-
tion of the difference, which is known 
as an underwriting gain. For example, 
in 2004, premiums exceeded claims 
by $979 million. Companies were al-
lowed to keep $848 million of this dif-
ference. In years in which premiums 
are less than insurance claims, com-
panies may have to pay a portion of 
the difference, an underwriting loss. 
In 2002, for example, claims exceeded 
premiums by $1.15 billion. Compa-
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nies had to pay the government $52 
million of this amount. 
The 2002 and 2004 examples 
nicely illustrate why, on average, 
crop insurance companies generate 
additional funding for their activi-
ties. In years in which underwriting 
gains are positive, companies get to 
keep a larger proportion of the gain 
than they have to pay the govern-
ment in years in which there are 
underwriting losses. The mechanism 
by which net gains and losses are 
determined is the Standard Reinsur-
ance Agreement (SRA). 
Companies generate net gains 
from the SRA in two ways. The fi rst 
is by determining which of their cus-
tomers are most likely to generate 
claims and then giving the premium 
from these customers and respon-
sibility for any subsequent losses 
directly to the government. The aver-
age customer retained by a company 
therefore has a better risk profi le 
than the average customer in the 
overall pool. Thus, average claims 
from the retained pool will be lower 
than the overall average, and the 
company will tend to make money.
However, the overall risk of loss 
from retained customers is still too 
large for companies to be willing to 
take on all losses. Hence the SRA is 
designed to have the government 
take on a portion of company losses 
when claims exceed premiums in 
exchange for companies giving the 
government some of their gains 
when premiums exceed claims. In 
essence, in exchange for companies 
taking on some of the risk of the 
crop insurance program, the gov-
ernment is allowing companies to 
generate some gains.
Table 2 summarizes estimates of 
the potential gains and losses to pri-
vate crop insurance companies from 
operation of the current SRA. These 
estimates are based on loss experi-
ence from 1993 to 2005.  The table 
presents four equally likely scenarios 
regarding crop insurance claims. As 
shown, we estimate that with $4 bil-
lion in premiums, companies should 
expect to make $435 million per year 
in net underwriting gains. 
The fi rst justifi cation for these 
gains is to compensate companies for 
the risk that they retain. Note that in 
the high-loss scenario, we estimate 
that private companies would lose an 
average of $223 million. Companies 
routinely argue that they need com-
pensation for taking this risk away 
from the government. The price to 
taxpayers for companies taking this 
loss 25 percent of the time is the aver-
age gain that the companies receive 
75 percent of the time, which amounts 
to $654 million. Clearly, the price gov-
ernment pays to induce companies to 
share risk is quite high.
The second justifi cation often 
given for these gains is to com-
pensate companies for the USDA 
requirement that all eligible farm-
ers must be offered crop insurance. 
This means that companies cannot 
easily choose to whom they can sell 
insurance. But, the SRA provision 
that allows companies to transfer 
premiums and losses from their 
high-risk customers directly to the 
government seems like adequate 
compensation for this requirement.
 
Policy Choices
Since 1980 Congress has made ex-
pansion of crop insurance a con-
sistent priority. To a large degree, 
ARPA has fi nally allowed Congress 
to achieve this objective. The cost 
is high, however. Program costs 
could be reduced if the mecha-
nisms that Congress and USDA have 
implemented to succeed in this 
Table 2. Potential gains and losses to crop insurance companies under 
the Standard Reinsurance Agreement
Continued on page 10
Table 1. U.S. crop insurance program coverage, premiums, and costs 
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ratings in Latin America. The pres-
ence of Nestlé and Fonterra in Chile 
may provide some of the fi nancial 
resources needed to promote a 
general increase in production scale 
and accelerate the rate of technol-
ogy adoption.
Our research suggests that the 
reduction of tariffs and elimination 
of subsidized dairy exports in a new 
WTO agreement will increase milk 
production in Argentina and Chile 
by 7 and 4 percent, respectively, 
over expected production under 
current policies. Argentine milk 
powder exports will increase by 
more than 20 percent, and cheese 
exports will rise more than 50 per-
cent. Similar impacts are projected 
for Chilean whole milk powder and 
cheese exports. However, the expan-
sion of Argentine dairy trade will be 
signifi cantly lower if the government 
does not eliminate its taxes on dairy 
exports.
International Prospects 
for U.S. Dairy Industries
These two case studies shed light 
on U.S. dairy prospects in global 
markets. The U.S. dairy industry 
combines most of the sources of 
competitiveness characterizing its 
two South American competitors: 
availability of inexpensive feed 
and land in many regions suitable 
for dairy production, high human 
capital, access to modern technol-
ogy, an effi cient processing sec-
tor, excellent transportation and 
communication infrastructures, low 
capital cost and credit risk, and a 
tradition in dairy production. So it 
is puzzling that the United States 
does not export more dairy prod-
ucts. The current U.S. dairy pro-
gram, with its price distortions and 
border impediments, obscures the 
international competitiveness of 
U.S. dairy and provides producers 
with incentives to cater to domes-
tic rather than to foreign markets. 
Reducing these domestic incen-
tives would force the U.S. dairy 
industry to turn outward, where it 
is well equipped to be internation-
ally competitive in world markets, 
especially if all countries reform 
their own distorting policies. ◆ 
Dairy in Argentina and Chile
Continued from page 5
expansion are not the most cost-
effi cient means of maintaining the 
status quo. 
All evidence suggests that high 
premium subsidies are needed to 
induce farmers to join the program. 
The overall cost of these subsidies 
could be reduced if the structure of 
premium subsidies was changed to 
decrease the incentive for farmers 
to buy the most expensive forms 
of crop insurance. We previously es-
timated that $300 million could be 
saved by such a move. 
Signifi cant savings could also be 
obtained by changing the way that 
A&O subsidies are determined. Most 
of these funds are captured by crop 
insurance agents. But given the grow-
ing familiarity of farmers with the 
program and the currently large mar-
ket penetration of insurance, do we 
need to continue to pay large com-
missions simply to maintain farmers 
in the program? One alternative is to 
pay a commission directly to those 
farmers who sign up for crop insur-
ance through the Internet or directly 
with RMA. Recent political battles be-
tween agents and innovative compa-
nies over premium reduction plans 
that allow farmers to capture a por-
tion of agent commissions indicates 
how diffi cult it would be to wean the 
industry away from the status quo of 
high commissions.
Considerable savings could 
also be obtained by making under-
writing gains and losses the sole 
responsibility of the federal govern-
ment. As illustrated here, the com-
pensation required to induce com-
panies to take on a small amount 
of risk (relative to the gains that 
they obtain) is large. We estimate 
that taxpayers would benefi t by an 
average of $435 million per year if 
USDA directly underwrote all risks 
from the crop insurance program. 
A potential downside from having 
the government underwrite all risk 
is that companies would lose the 
incentive they now have in their re-
tained business to prevent fraud. ◆ 
Crop Insurance
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